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COPYRIGHT LAW 
COMMUNITY FOR CREATIVE 
NON- VIOLENCE 
v. JAMES EARL REID: A 
CLEARER PICTURE FOR ARTISTS 
Christopher M. Windle* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Community for Creative Non- Violence v. James Earl 
Reid l the United States Supreme Court addressed copyright 
ownership of artwork made for hire by independent contractors. 
Prior to this decision, courts held four differing views2 on vesting 
of copyright for free-lance artists including writers, photogra-
phers, designers, composers, illustrators, painters and film-
makers.s The Ninth Circuit view of work for hire closely paral-
lels the Supreme Court view. Community for Creative Non-
Violence affects not only the initial vesting of copyright owner-
ship but also copyright duration,' owner's renewal rights,!! termi-
• Christopher M. Windle is an associate with the law firm, Cartwright, Slobodin, 
Bokelman, Borowsky, Wartnick, Moore & Harris, Inc. Prior to graduating from Golden 
Gate University School of Law in 1988, he owned his own graphic design business in San 
Francisco. 
1. 109 S.Ct. 2166 (1989). 
2. See infra n. 23-26 and accompanying text. 
3. 17 U.S.C. §102 (1976) provides a partiailisting of the subject matter of copyright. 
4. 17 U.S.C. §302(c)(1976) provides in part: 
In the case of. . . work made for hire, the copyright endures 
for a term of seventy-five years from the year of its first publi-
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nation rights6 and the right to import certain goods bearing the 
copyright.7 
Copyright initially vests in the author of the work.8 How-
ever, a distinction is made for "work made for hire" under the 
1976 Copyright Act.9 
In the case of work made for hire, the employer or 
other person for whom the work was prepared is 
considered the author ... and ... owns all of the 
rights comprised in the copyright.10 
Artists who provide work for hire are denied copyright 
ownership. 
Prior to Community for Creative Non- Violence, the con-
tours of the work for hire doctrine were ill defined since courts 
acted without benefit of legislative guidelines. The holding of 
Community for Creative Non- Violence resolves the ambiguities 
surrounding work for hire.ll This comment will briefly review 
the history of work for hire; analyze the Supreme Court Deci-
sion; compare the Supreme Court decision and the view of the 
Ninth Circuit; and comment on the impact of Community for 
Creative Non- Violence on free-Iance12 artists. 
II. FACTS 
The Washington, D.C., based Community for Creative Non-
Violence (hereinafter "CCNV") commissioned a Baltimore artist 
creation, whichever expires first. 
5. 17 U.S.C. §304(a) (1976). This section provides that: 
In the case of work made for hire, "the proprietor of such 
copyright shall be entitle to a renewal and extension of the 
copyright in such work for the furthest term of forty-seven 
years .... 
6. See 17 U.S.C. §203(a) (1976). Provisions of this section regarding termination of 
transfers and licenses granted by the author do not apply to cases involving work for 
hire. 
7. 17 U.S.C. §601(b)(l) (1976). See Cooling Systems and Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart 
Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1985). 
8. See 17 U.S.C. §201(a) (1976) which reads in part: 
Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in 
the author or authors of the work. 
9. 17 U.S.C. §201(b) (1976). 
10. [d. 
11. The phrase "work for hire" refers to the statutory phrase "works made for hire." 
12. Free lance[rJ is used interchangeably with independent contractor. 
2
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to create a sculpture depicting a homeless family which was dis-
played at a political event. IS CCNY conceived the idea for the 
project and chose the title. The work was done by the artist in 
his Baltimore studio where he used his own tools. CCNY partici-
pated in the design of the project and independently produced 
the base for the figures. The statue was displayed for a month 
and returned to the artist for repairs. The artist subsequently 
filed a certificate of copyright for the work in his name. CCNY 
filed a competing certificate of copyright and sued for a determi-
nation of copyright ownership. 14 
The trial court ruled the statue was a work for hire under 
§ 101 of the Copyright Act and that CCNY owned the copy-
right. HI The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia re-
versed, holding that the sculpture was not a work for hire and 
the artist owned the copyright because he was an independent 
contractor.16 The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
III. WORK FOR HIRE 
Work for hire is typically provided by commercial artists 
working as independent contractors who bid on projects and are 
responsible for benefits and taxes. 17 The clientl8 may use free-
lancers because it does not have the volume of work necessary to 
support staff artists or finds it cheaper than maintaining an in-
house staff. The client realizes a savings by avoiding the added 
expense of benefits. 
Often, the issue of copyright ownership is not addressed and 
the client assumes copyright ownership since it paid for the 
work. A dispute may arise when the artwork is used outside the 
scope of the original project. 
13. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 652 Fed.Supp. 1453, 1454 
(D.D.C. 1987). 
14. Neither party discussed copyright during negotiations. [d. 
15. Community for Creative Non- Violence, 652 F.Supp. at 1457. 
16. Community for Creative Non- Violence v. Reid, 846 Fed.2d 1485, 1499 (D.C. Cir. 
1988). 
17. For a discussion of artists' business arrangements, see L. DUBOFF, ART LAW 773-
792 (1977). 
18. "Client" refers to commissioning party and purchaser. 
3
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1909 COPYRIGHT AND INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS 
Traditionally, copyright vests in the author of the work.19 
The 1909 Copyright Act20 provided that the term author in-
cluded an employer in the case of works made for hire.21 The 
Act did not define the terms employer, employee or works made 
for hire. The courts were responsible for defining these terms 
and a majority ruled that an independent contractor is an em-
ployee for copyright purposes.22 It was presumed that the artist 
had impliedly agreed to convey the copyright to the hiring 
party.2S 
1976 COPYRIGHT ACTu 
In 1955, the Congress initiated revision of the Copyright Act 
and after debating the work for hire doctrine reached a compro-
mise. Section 101 of the 1976 Act created two categories of work 
for hire. 
(1) A work prepared by an employee within the scope of his 
or her employment; or 
(2) A work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a 
contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or 
other audio-visual work, as a translation, as a supplementary 
work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as an-
swer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly 
agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall 
be considered a work made for hire.211 
The 1976 Act, like its predecessor, did not define key terms 
and courts assumed the task of interpreting this statute. Four 
views on work for hire evolved.28 
19. This right was acknowledged by the United States Constitution in Article I, §8 
cl. 8. 
20. 17 U.S.C. §26 (1976 ed.) (1909 Act). 
21. [d. 
22. See Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin, Co., 108 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939). 
23. [d. 
24. 17 U.S.C. §101 et. seq. 
25. 17 U.S.C. §101 (1976). 
26. A discussion of the ambiguity of the Copyright Act is provided in Easter Seal 
Society for Crippled Children and Adults of Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy Enterprise, 815 
4
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The first vested copyright ownership with the client who re-
tained control over production. In Peregrine v. Lauren Corp.27 
the court focused on the client's right to supervise a photogra-
pher even though he was an independent contractor for tax and 
benefit purposes. Peregrine held determinative the fact that the 
client could change or reject the photographer's ideas. A second 
view was expressed by the Second Circuit in Aldon Accessories, 
Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc. 28 where the court closely examined the crea-
tive process. Aldon held that copyright vests with the client who 
actively supervises and directs the artist during production of 
the artwork. 
The third view was endorsed by the 5th Circuit in Easter 
Seal Society for Crippled Children and Adults of Louisiana, 
Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises. 29 Easter Seal relied on agency law 
to define the term employee and limited the client's right to 
copyright ownership to the nine categories listed in section 
101(2) of the Copyright Act. 
The final view, expressed by the Ninth Circuit in Dumas v. 
Gommermanso held that only the works of salaried employees 
are covered by §101(1). Section 101(2) limits client ownership to 
the nine categories of commissioned works. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court resolved the copyright issue by relying 
on agency principles31 and held that Section 101 of the Copy-
right Act created two categories of client ownership: 1) works 
prepared by employees and 2) the nine categories of commis-
sioned works.s2 
The Court noted that a determination of copyright owner-
ship begins with ascertaining whether the work was performed 
f.2d 323, 328-29 (5th Cir. 1987). 
27. 601 F.Supp. 828 (Colo. 1985). 
28. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984). 
29. 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987). 
30. 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989). 
31. The court relied on the Restatement of Agency for guidance. Community for 
Creative Non- Violence at 2171, n. 31. 
32. Community for Creative Non- Violence, 846 F.2d at 2170. 
5
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by an employee or an independent contractor.33 If the work was 
performed by an employee, Section 101(1) applies and the em-
ployer owns the copyright.34 Otherwise, copyright vests with the 
independent contractor except for the nine categories of work 
listed in Section 101(2).311 
The following agency principles were applied by the Court 
to determine if the artist was an employee: whether the client 
controlled the manner and means by which the project was ac-
complished;3s the skill required;37 the source of the instrumen-
talities and tools;38 location of the work;39 duration of the rela-
tionship between the parties;40 whether the hiring party has the 
right to assign additional projects to the hired party;U extent of 
the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work;42 
method of payment;43 the artist's role in hiring and paying as-
sistants;" whether the work is part of the regular business of the 
client; 41! whether the client is in business;4s provision of employ-
ment benefit;47 and the tax treatment of the hired party.48 
In Community for Creative Non-Violence, the Supreme 
Court rejected the Peregrine and Aldon view that a client's right 
to exercise control over the project is dispositive.'9 The Court 
stressed that no single factor was determinative. llo The client in 
Community for Creative Non- Violence conceived the idea for 
the sculpture; provided design input; directed the production to 
33. [d. at 2171. 
34. [d. at 2169. 
35. [d. 
36. See Hilton Int'l Co. v. NLRB, 690 F.2d 318, 320 (2d Cir. 1982). 
37. See Bartels v. Burmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 132 (1947). 
38. See NLRB v. United States Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §220(2)(e). 
39. See Darden v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 796 F.2d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 1986). 
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §220(2)(f). 
41. See Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1105. 
42. See Short v. Central States Southeast & Southeast Areas Pension Fund, 729 
F.2d 567, 574 (8th Cir. 1984). 
43. See Holt v. Winpisinger, 811 F.2d 1532, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
44. United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 719 (1947). 
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §220(2)(h). 
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §220(2)(j). 
47. See Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1105. 
48. [d. 
49. Community for Creative Non- Violence, 109 S.Ct. at 2170. 
50. [d. 
6
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ensure the finished sculpture met their specifications; and chose 
the title. lIl Nevertheless, the court ruled that on balance, the art-
ist was an independent contractor .112 The court was persuaded by 
the facts that the artist was a sculptor, a skilled occupation; he 
worked in his own studio with his own tools; the artist was given 
only this one commission; he worked at his own pace; and the 
client did not provide any benefits or pay any payroll or social 
security taxes.1I3 
After weighing all the factors, the Court determined the art-
ist was an independent contractor and the client could not claim 
copyright ownership under §101(1).1I4 Furthermore, the client 
was denied copyright under §101(2) because the project was not 
one of the nine listed categories.1I1I The Court concluded that the 
client was not the author of the work by application of the work 
for hire provision.1I8 
V. COMPARISON OF COMMUNITY FOR CREATIVE 
NON- VIOLENCE AND DUMAS 
Dumas v. Gommerman ll7 was a case of first impression for 
the Ninth Circuit on the issue of whether the District Court ap-
plied the correct legal standard in determining if an artist is an 
employee producing work for hire under 17 U.S.C. §101.118 In 
Dumas ll9 the artist was hired by ITT to create four lithographs. 
ITT later sold the copyright to Stefan Gommerman. Jennifer 
Dumas, widow of the artist, sued for copyright as successor in 
interest.8o Gommerman did not contend that the artist had been 
an employee of ITT but argued that the appropriate test for de-
termining if an artist is an employee is whether there was any 
51. Community for Creative Non- Violence, 652 F.Supp. 1453, 1454 (D.D.C. 1987). 




56. [d. (The Court acknowledged that CCNV could be a joint author. See, 17 U.S.C. 
§§101 and 201(a) (1976». 
57. 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989). 
58. Prior to Dumas, the Ninth Circuit had reviewed work for hire under the 1909 
Act in, May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Associate, 618 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir.1980). 
59. In 1979 Patrick Nagel was commissioned to create four works of art that lIT 
Cannon gave as sets of lithographs to its distributors as part of a promotional campaign. 
60. The original paintings were lost. Gommerman purchased the remaining sets of 
lithographs from ITT Cannon. 
7
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identifiable direction and control.S1 The Ninth Circuit rejected 
this argument and foreshadowed the Supreme Court decision 
with its view that the 1976 Act creates only two instances where 
the artist loses the copyright. They are: (1) if the artist is an 
employee of the purchaser or (2) if the work falls under any of 
the enumerated catagories in §101(2) and the parties have a 
written agreement.S2 
The Ninth Circuit deviates from the Supreme Court view 
which permits the courts to look at the employers right to con-
trol the manner and means by which the art work is produced in 
determining if the artist is an employee.ss The Ninth Circuit re-
jects the supervision and control test because it could result in 
employers changing the employment status of an artist as was 
done in Peregrine.64 In the Ninth Circuit's view, the 1976 Copy-
right Act created a bright line between employee and indepen-
dent contractor for the purpose of safeguarding the rights of art-
ists working as independent contractors. The Ninth Circuit 
feared that "some independent Contractors could be deemed 
'employees' where the purchaser includes provisions in the con-
tract granting it substantial rights of control."SIi 
The Ninth Circuit alone addresses the issue of copyright in-
ception. Under the 1909 Act, Federal copyright was secured by 
publication with notice.ss The 1976 act changed the law and pro-
vided that copyright subsists from the moment of fixation in any 
tangible medium. Publication is not a factor.67 Furthermore, 
61. Gommerman contended that the artist was an employee if ITf had exercised 
control over the creative process in any amount and pointed to the fact that ITf, 
through its agent, D'Arcy, MacManus & Masius, Inc., had directed some of the design 
aspects of the paintings. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1094. 
62. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1102. 
63. In Community for Creative Non- Violence, the Supreme Court utilized several 
common law agency factors to determine if the artist was an employee. They included, 
"the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is ac-
complished." Community for Creative Non- Violence, 109 S.Ct.at 2178. 
64. In Peregrine, the photographer was an independent contractor based on the 
method of payment. However, the trial court found the artist was an employee because 
"it was clear that at any point the employer could have vetoed any of Mr. Peregrine's 
ideas .... " Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F.Supp. 828, 829 (D.C.Colo.1985). 
65. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1104. The Ninth Circuit intends to prevent the possibility 
that the purchaser can unilaterally change the artist's employment status without the 
artist's knowledge. [d. 
66. 17 U.S.C. §10 (repealed 1976). 
67. See 17 U.S.C. section 101, definition of "created" and "fixed" which provides: 
8
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copyright under the 1976 act exists even in work in progress.68 
The Ninth Circuit also makes clear that a transfer of copy-
right ownership requires a written instrument.6s Therefore, the 
sale alone of a material object in which a work is fixed does not 
transfer the copyright in the work.70 Since §201(a) establishes 
the author as initial owner of the copyright in works other than 
works for hire and copyright vests in the independent contractor 
at the moment of fixation, a written instrument is required to 
transfer copyright ownership to the purchaser.71 
The Ninth Circuit sheds light on another aspect of the inde-
pendent contractors' rights under the 1976 Copyright Act. As 
the original owner of the copyright, the independent contractor 
retains termination rights even if copyright is transferred.72 17 
68.Id. 
A work is "created" when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord 
for the first time; where work is prepared over a period of 
time, the portion of it that has been fixed at any particular 
time constitutes the work as of that time, and where the work 
has been prepared in different versions, each version consti-
tutes a separate work. 
A work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its 
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the au-
thority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to 
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work 
consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmit-
ted, is "fixed" for purposes of this title if a fixation of the 
work is being made simultaneously with its transmission. 
69. 17 U.S.C. §204(a) provides: 
(a) A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation 
of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a 
note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed 
by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner's duly au-
thorized agent. 
70. See 17 U.S.C. §202 which provides: 
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights 
under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material 
object in which the work is embodied. transfer of ownership of 
any material object, including the copy or phonorecord in 
which the work is first fixed, does not itself convey any rights 
in the copyright work embodied in the object; nor, in the ab-
sence of an agreement, does transfer of ownership of a copy-
right or of any exclusive rights under a copyright convey prop-
erty rights in any material object. 
71. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1097-98. 
72. See 17 U.S.C. §203. 
9
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U.S.C. §203(a) provides that for works other than those made 
for hire, a transfer or license of the copyright or any right under 
the copyright is subject to termination thirty-five years after the 
transfer or license is made.7s The Ninth Circuit decision in Du-
mas and the Supreme Court holding in Community for Creative 
Non- Violence, provide for present as well as future copyright 
protection for the artist. 
VI. IMPACT ON ARTISTS 
Preferably, an artist's business transaction includes a writ-
ten contract which addresses copyright ownership.7. In the ab-
sence of a written contractual agreement, an artist who is an in-
dependent contractor retains copyright ownership unless the 
work is one of the nine categories listed in §lOl(2) and there is a 
written agreement.711 
Copyright infringement gives the author the right to recover 
the actual damages suft'ered.76 Generally, the artist is entitled to 
the fair market value of the artwork.77 Furthermore, the author 
is entitled to "any profits of the infringer that are attributable to 
the infringement and are not taken into account in computing 
the actual damages."78 Cost and in some cases, attorneys fees are 
also recoverable.79 
Community for Creative Non- Violence establishes that 
copyright ownership vests with the independent contractor. Du-
mas explains that copyright ownership begins with fixation and 
the independent contractor initially owns the copyright. If the 
artist transfers copyright ownership, the transfer is subject to 
termination thirty-five years later.6o By holding that the copy-
right initially vests with the independent contractor, Commu-
73. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1098. 
74. Any artist working as an independent contractor who contractually agrees to 
permit copyright ownership to vest in the client is entitled to unemployment insurance 
provided by the client. See CAL. LAB. CODE §3351.5. 
75. See supra n. 21 and accompanying text. 
76. 17 U.S.C. §504. 
77. See Atken v. Hazen, Hoffman, etc., v. Empire Construction Co., 542 F.Supp. 
252, 263 (Neb. 1982). 
78. 17 U.S.C. §504(b). 
79. 17 U.S.C. §505. 
80. See 17 U.S.C. §203. 
10
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nity for Creative Non- Violence and Dumas secure for the artist 
the "opportunity to renegotiate the transfer after the market 
value of the work has been more precisely determined."81 
Community for Creative Non- Violence represents a major 
step towards advancing artists rights. The artist working as an 
independent contractor owns copyright ownership in most cases 
and if the copyright is transferred, the independent contractor is 
entitled to renegotiate the value of the copyright in the future. 
81. Dumas. 865 F.2d at 1098. 
11
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